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ABSTRACT 
The fact that major fires are rare events in underground metal mines means there is often little on-site experience in 
dealing with these situations. Elaborate strategies that rely on a high degree of training at all levels to be effective are 
likely to fail, especially with the trend in Australia towards smaller mines and "fly in-fly out" operations. A robust strat-
egy is required. The key items in such a strategy are: early detection and warning of personnel, personal belt-worn oxy-
gen-generating self-rescuers, high integrity escape routes and self-contained refuge stations, simple procedures, reliable 
personnel ''tagging" systems and sufficient, trained, search and rescue and fire fighting personnel and equipment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A major underground mine fire is the nightmare scenario 
for any mine worker or mine manager. The hazards from a 
major mine fire have increased substantially over the past 
few decades with the enormous increase in electrical and 
diesel equipment in underground metal mines. The mobility 
of the workforce has also increased with mechanisation and 
the introduction of adits and ramps for many underground 
mines which would have been shaft-access only in the past. 
However, new and increasingly "useable" technology such 
as lightweight, oxygen-generating self-rescuers, through-
the-rock communication and more effective refuge cham-
bers are also influencing egress strategies. Finally, commu-
nity expectations and tolerance have changed significantly 
over the past few decades, with multiple mine fatalities now 
a completely unacceptable outcome even in the event of a 
serious mine fire. All these factors result in the need to to-
tally review the strategies which the mining industry uses to 
deal with major underground mine fires. 
The Enterprise mine project (EMP) is located at Mount lsa, 
Australia, and is wholly owned by Mount lsa Mines Lim-
ited. It is being developed, at a cost of $330 million, from 
about l ,OOOm below surface to 1, 700 m below surface and 
over the next 15 years, will extend to 2,000 m below sur-
face. The project is designed to upgrade the existing 1.5 
Mtpa operation to 3.5 Mtpa. Expected completion for the 
development and construction program is late calender 
1999. During construction, the underground workforce will 
peak at 700 persons, with a workforce of 400 required dur-
ing on-going production. 
In June 1997, the Enterprise Mine Project (EMP) com-
pleted a risk assessment of all activities in the project. On a 
scale of 1 (negligible risk) to 25 (extreme risk), emergency 
egress was scored at 22. 
Shortly after this, the Moura No 2 Inquiry was com-
pleted. This was an inquiry into an underground coal mine 
explosion in 1994 in Australia in which eleven persons died 
(out of 21 underground at the time). One of the key recom-
mendations from the Inquiry was that every mine (coal and 
non-coal) should undertake a risk review to identify the 
"one or two" credible disaster scenarios relevant to their 
situation and ensure an effective plan exists to reduce the 
risk and consequence of disaster. The inquiry noted that a 
reduction in lost time injury frequency rate (L TIFR) will not 
necessarily translate into a reduced risk of catastrophes. 
This is because the very low-probability, high-consequence 
nature of a disaster requires a different focus and manage-
ment strategy to a reduction in L TIFR. 
Despite no catastrophic disaster at the Mount Isa (Isa) 
underground mines in their 75 years of operation, and de-
spite the very large mines and workforce over these years, 
there are a number of reasons why emergency egress at 
EMP rated this score. 
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THE FIRE HAZARD 
Early in the study, it was recognised that a major fire was 
the most credible emergency egress situation in the EMP. 
This is because humans can only survive a few minutes with 
insufficient oxygen, and can only survive for as little as 
seconds when some poisonous products of combustion 
(POC) enter the lungs 1• Underground mine fires consume 
large quantities of oxygen (potentially producing oxygen 
deficient atmospheres) and produce large volumes of carbon 
dioxide2 and carbon monoxide; plus many other toxic gases. 
Any other credible disaster scenario at EMP provides a 
longer safe response time than a frre3• Moreover, because 
the ventilating air enters all the workings, a fire is the only 
credible hazard with the potential to affect a large number 
of persons. 
This conclusion is consistent with experience in the 
USA which shows that, despite underground mining con-
tributing only a very small percentage of industrial output, 
of the 98 industrial fires from 1900 to 1990 which resulted 
in 50 or more deaths, 51 of these fires occurred in mines 
(Hartman, eta/., 1997). 
The Enterprise mine is situated below the existing cop-
per and lead mines and is therefore potentially affected by 
any fire or other disaster in these mines. Because there was 
extensive infrastructure already existing in these mines 
(hoisting facilities, ventilation shafts, etc., and because these 
mines are now winding down and have surplus capacity, it 
was decided to extend these existing shafts into the EMP, 
rather than create new, dedicated EMP shafts direct to sur-
face. This has reduced the standalone ability of the EMP. 
Virgin rock temperatures (VRT) at EMP are 55° at 1.35 
km and will be 68° at 2 km. This is higher than VR Ts at 
most underground operations in the world, including South 
Africa. Combined with very high surface summer tempera-
tures, failure of the ventilation or 40 MWr refrigeration 
system results in rapid increases in temperature under-
1 There is little information available about the actual time-
dependent concentrations of POCs produced in underground mine 
fires. However, extensive work has been done measuring, over 
time, the production of POCs in the cabins of wide-body aircraft. 
These indicate that concentrations of HCL and HF exceed allow-
able concentrations within 30 seconds of ignition, and that CO and 
C02 concentrations are three to 12 times the short-term exposure 
limits within 60 seconds of ignition (Sarkos et al 1982). 
2 Carbon dioxide is twenty times more soluble in blood than is 
oxygen. Haemoglobin has an affinity for carbon monoxide about 
300 times that of its affinity for oxygen, plus haemoglobin is un-
stable - therefore releases oxygen readily - whereas carboxy-
haemoglobin is stable and therefore accumulates in the blood. 
3 This, of course, will not necessarily be true of other mines. 
ground, which has a major effect on egress strategy. Fur-
thennore, to avoid adding additional heat into the fresh air 
intakes, the EMP ventilation system is based on an "ex-
hausting only" principle; this is in contrast to the "push-
pull" systems used earlier at Isa. A push-pull system (which 
includes a surface fan to push air underground) provides a 
highly secure "fresh air base" at the offtake on each sub-
level from each fresh air shaft. An exhausting system oper-
ates under negative pressure and therefore is more risky. 
However, if it operates with a dedicated and highly secure 
system of intake airways, it provides almost the same level 
of safety as a positive pressure system. For refrigerated 
mines, an exhausting system is usually used along with di-
rect forcing ventilation from the intakes using auxiliary fans 
and flexible ducts. This minimises temperatures at the 
workplace but significantly reduces the security of the air 
intakes as a frre on one level could result in failure of one or 
more of the auxiliary fans which, even with self-closing 
dampers, could result in air reversals and entry of combus-
tion products into the intakes. 
It must be emphasised that if a serious fire breaks out 
underground, lives are immediately in danger and the risk to 
life and health is very high, even with the best of emergency 
plans. Therefore preventing fires is and must remain the 
highest priority in terms of egress strategy. However, the lsa 
mines have a good record in preventing serious fires under-
ground and, while it was recognised that these existing 
measures also need to be reviewed, the most urgent issue 
was identified as being the contingency plan in the event of 
a major underground fire. 
OVERALL PHILOSOPHY 
There were some guiding principles required in the design 
of any emergency system at EMP. These were based on the 
fact that a disaster scenario, almost by definition, has a very 
low probability of ever happening, and will therefore be 
outside the experience of most mine workers and managers. 
These principles include: 
• The acceptable level of risk. At EMP, it was decided to 
start from the presumption that "there should be negligible 
risk of any further harm to anyone as a result of the disas· 
ter". In other words, people may have been injured in the 
initial incident which gave rise to the disaster (e.g., burns) 
but there should be no further harm to themselves or others 
resulting from the POCs from the fire. The very fact that a 
major disaster has occurred underground means "we have 
failed once", the egress protocol is to ensure "we do not fail 
again". 
• A systems approach would be used to ensure the overall 
design was integrated, comprehensive and cost effective, 
and to get maximum synergy from the various components. 
AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY FOR EMERGENCY EGRESS 
FROM AN UNDERGROUND METAL MINE 
651 
• The overall system used must have a minimum of com-
plexity for the operators: the "keep it simple" principle. 
• The equipment within the system must be able to be 
used almost intuitively (e.g., opening and donning of self-
rescuers and use of breathable air equipment inside refuge 
stations). 
• The system and equipment in it must be fail-safe, or 
have effective backup. 
• Equipment must be easy and inexpensive to maintain. 
Where practical, equipment should be "dual-purpose", i.e., 
used for both daily operations and emergencies, as experi-
ence shows that equipment which is used for routine opera-
tions tends to be better maintained than equipment which 
will only ever be used in a "disaster" scenario. 
• The systems must provide a high degree of on-going 
operational readiness. 
• The systems (e.g., escape-ways) must be capable of be-
ing traversed by mine workers who meet the minimum 
physical fitness requirements for the mine4• Much of the 
work in modem mining is now fairly sedentary and the fit-
ness levels of many miners is poor. They would be unable 
to "self-escape" up any significant vertical distance using a 
ladder, or even a significant distance of ramp. 
• The systems must be able to handle the likely level of 
panic and confusion in an emergency, and therefore rely to 
the least possible extent on the mine worker's memory or 
compliance with procedures for effectiveness. 
ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED 
An early question asked in the review was ''what are the 
fundamental differences between a large underground in-
dustrial facility (i.e., a mine) and a large surface industrial 
facility (e.g., a skyscraper)". Since the 1800s and before, 
mines have considered themselves to be unique and their 
problems to be unique. However, in the case of fire proce-
dures, this view of "uniqueness" can no longer be entirely 
supported. No one accepts that skyscrapers should have the 
same emergency procedures in the 1990s as they did 1 00 
years ago. Technology has changed and community expec-
tations have also changed. 
Because above-ground facilities are more numerous than 
underground mines, fires in above-ground facilities are also 
more common, in absolute numbers, than in underground 
mines. Vast experience has been gathered as to the pre-
cautions that are required in above-ground facilities to pre-
vent a serious fire resulting in loss of life. These pre-
cautions include: 
4 There are a variety of these; but the two critical ones in terms 
of escape are for workers at EMP to have a maximum BMI (body 
mass index) of35 and a minimum V02max of30 ml 0/kg/min. 
• Early detection of the fire through smoke and other de-
tectors. 
• Activation (automatic) of an alarm system that immedi-
ately notifies all potentially affected persons. 
• A "fail-safe" non-mechanical second means of egress 
which provides quick and/or secure access to safety. 
• Sprinkler systems or other frre suppression systems. 
• Regular fire drills to ensure all persons know what to do, 
where to go, etc. 
To some extend these measures have not been adopted 
in underground· mines because the technology (e.g., reliable, 
instantaneous communications) has not been available in the 
past~ however, this is generally no longer true. 
It should also be noted that the fire detection, alarming 
and suppression systems in most large commercial above-
ground buildings constitutes between 2% and 5% of the 
total capital cost. Very few underground mines would spend 
anywhere between 2% to 5% of the total project cost on fire 
prevention and control systems. This is one indication that 
the frre hazard in underground mines is not yet fully consid-
ered at the feasibility or operational stage. 
As discussed earlier, it is rare for anyone underground in 
a metal mine to be in danger from the frre itself. It is the 
products of combustion (POC) that present the danger. In 
many respects the safest thing a person could do in the event 
of a serious frre producing lots of POC would be to don a 
self-rescuer and wait until the fire went out or was put out. 
This is because of the hazard posed by trying to travel 
through smoke. The underground environment is generally 
unlit. Floors are often rough. Drives are sometimes cluttered 
with equipment or conveyors. Visibility in smoke is poor 
and sometimes nil. If anyone is in doubt about the visibility 
problem when in smoke, a simple test is to tum one's cap 
lamp off when underground and notice the immediate dis-
orientation and anxiety that occurs. There is the hazard of 
falling down or driving down vertical openings, such as 
stopes or passes, even with barricades installed. In nil visi-
bility situations, persons very rapidly become disoriented 
and lose direction. Experience at Isa is that workers can 
even be mistaken about such basic things as whether they 
are travelling up or down a 1 in 7 ramp. 
PROBLEMS WITH CURRENT APPROACHES 
Because of this, a foundation upon which the egress strategy 
at lsa in the past has been based is the maxim "Do not enter 
·smoke". This presumes there are credible other alternatives, 
5 In coal mines, there is also the danger of an explosion or of the 
coal seam catching on fire. Plus, there is now great reluctance in 
Australia to allow mine rescue teams to enter a coal mine where an 
explosive mixture of gases is known to exist. In such circum-
stances, mine workers must effect their own "self-rescue" (Anon, 
1998) 
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such as escapeways and entrapped procedures. The "fail 
safe" entrapment procedure at Isa has previously been to tie 
one's shirt to a compressed air outlet, or to cut a hole in a 
vent duct and breath fresh air from the duct. However, these 
have serious problems at EMP: 
• The standard development size is 5 m x 5 m or larger, so 
mine air outlets and vent ducts are normally too high to be 
reached without a tall vehicle. 
• It is not practical to put air droppers from the com-
pressed air line to ground level frequently enough to pro-
vide for entrapment6• 
• With the size of diesel equipment now in operation in 
modem mines, a ftre could easily have sufficient heat to 
burn out the connections in the mine air lines, to bum the 
vent duct or even to reverse the ventilation flow. 
• Working places are supplied with refrigerated air di-
rectly from fresh air raises using flexible plastic ventilation 
ducts. The fresh air raises operate under negative pressure 
so a fire in a vent duct which trips out one of the many fans 
connected directly to the raise, will result in polluted air re-
entering the raise, which would compromise the air in the 
raise and any other working places fed from the raise. 
• With the high temperatures in EMP during summer, 
persons need to drink water to maximise their probability of 
survival. Water may not be available in either of the above 
entrapped procedures. 
The issue of "second means of egress" (a statutory re-
quirement) was also given considerable thought during the 
review. The ErviP has three main means of egress, these 
being a 1 in 1 0 gradient production ramp, a second 1 in 7 
service ramp and an inclined ladderway in a fresh air raise. 
Each of these connects most of the main working levels. 
However, the reality for EMP, as for all mines, is that the 
mining operation itself requires development of new sources 
of ore and therefore new working places, many of which 
are, at least initially, "dead ends". In fact, the high activity 
areas of the mine are often the areas currently being devel-
oped and these will rarely have two separate and independ-
ent means of egress with separate ventilation. Moreover, 
most modem mine workers are not especially fit, and never 
use ladders in their ordinary course of work. The necessary 
work rate and unfamiliarity of miners with climbing ladders 
resulted in the EMP review coming to the following conclu-
sions: 
• a second means of egress is required from all main 
working areas, but 
• the second means of egress is not primarily for workers 
to escape; rather it is for access by mine rescue teams to 
workers who have taken refuge in safe areas or to search for 
6 However, the ' entrapped' procedure using compressed air line 
and one's shirt is still taught as development ends often do have 
accessible compressed air. 
and rescue lost or trapped workers, including retrieval of the 
injured using stretchers. 
This conclusion is endorsed by the South African Min-
eral Act Regulation 24.20.27 which states: 
The manager shall see to it that there is a refuge bay or 
other safe area in a mine or works within easy reach of 
workmen and within the limits of protection afforded by 
a rescuing device, in the event of an explosion, fire or 
other emergency. 
In a metal mine, the most probable cause of a major fire 
is either mobile diesel equipment or a conveyor. It was 
agreed that the shortest time to detect the fire and communi-
cate the problem to Mine Control8 is ten minutes9 from the 
start of the fire. 
Isa mine has between six and eight fully trained, volun-
teer mine rescue crews available (on call) at any given time 
plus two full-time mine rescue coordinators. The minimum 
time required to assemble a mine rescue crew on the surface 
is 20 minutes from notification. 
The best response of Mine Rescue is to be underground 
and at the fire within another 20 minutes. 
By this time, a minimum of 50 minutes has elapsed from 
the start of the frre. At this point, any fire on a conveyor or 
diesel equipment would be a raging inferno. The best Mine 
Rescue could hope to achieve, in terms of putting the ftre 
out, is a further two hours; the worst is up to four hours 10• 
Therefore, there are several critical reasons to get people 
to safety quickly'': 
• To have a truly credible "entrapped" procedure would 
require a person to have a fail-safe supply of breathable air 
for at least five hours. This rules out even the largest of belt-
worn, self-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs). 
• It is difficult, if not impossible for relatively untrained 
miners to drink water safely without contaminating their 
self-rescuer. If "trapped" in very hot conditions without 
7 This 1956 Act was replaced with Duty of Care style legislation 
in 1991 , but the basic principle remains. 
8 Mine Control is a surface control and emergency centre which 
is manned continuously. 
9 If the fire starts when someone is present, then the first re-
sponse is to try to put the fire out, usually with two fire extin-
guishers on larger items of equipment, in addition to engine fire 
suppression equipment, where fitted. Hence at least ten minutes 
would occur before any phone call could be made. 
1 0 After two hours, most of the fuel and oil on a large piece of 
mobile equipment would have burnt out and the fire could be 
contained. The four hour scenario assumes the fire is upwind or at 
a higher elevation than the fire fighters ; both of these situations 
make the fire very difficult to approach or to fight with foam. 
11 Note that the risk of a fire setting off a major explosion is neg-
ligible in a metal mine, and therefore there is not the same need as 
usually exists in a coal mine to get persons out of the mine. 
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water, survival time could be limited by maximum dehy-
dration to 5 to 6 hours (about 10-12% of body weight 
(Adolf, 1995)). However, acute thirst will be felt at 4% de-
hydration, which could be reached within 2 hours, and even 
earlier if the worker is already mildly dehydrated before the 
emergency occurs, as would often be the case. 
• The EMP operation is geographically large, and mine 
rescue crews need to know who is unaccounted for, before 
starting an effective search and rescue operation. If there are 
numerous miners using an "entrapped" procedure and un-
able to communicate with the surface, then resources and 
time will be wasted and lives could be lost. 
• Most miners would experience distress and panic if 
trapped in smoke for several hours. It is common for per-
sons who wear face masks for several hours to become quite 
agitated. There is a high probability that personal judgement 
would be impaired, especially if the individual is also dehy-
drated, which could result in increased risk of injury or 
death. This is reinforced by the history of self-rescuers, 
which shows that hundreds of miners have died "sucking on 
the ends of self-rescuers"12• However, few if any, have died 
after reaching an emergency refuge station. 
A NEW APPROACH 
These observations led to the following conclusions: 
• There is no entirely reliable, credible, "personal" en-
trapment procedure for EMP for the duration of a serious 
fire. 
• Emergency refuge stations are required and need to be 
located to ensure all persons can access the station; the sta-
tions need to be designed to keep the occupants safe for up 
to 8 hours before rescue. The design of emergency refuge 
stations must be based on sound physiological and other 
criteria (Brake and Bates, in prep). 
• Second means of egress are not primarily for workers to 
escape, but for mine rescue teams to access workers who 
have taken refuge in emergency refuge stations. 
• Miners at EMP may need to travel through smoke to get 
to an emergency refuge station. To maximise the likelihood 
that this could be done safely, the evacuation order must be 
given as early as possible, and the message must reach the 
miners as early as possible, while smoke levels are still 
light. 
• Previous tests of stench gas at EMP showed that it could 
take up to two hours to evacuate the mine using stench gas 
12 For example, in the 1972 Sunshine Mine (USA) fire in which 
91 miners died, many died wearing their filter-type self-rescuer. 
This problem is not confined to filter self-rescuers, as records from 
South Africa show that from 1987 to 1994, 48 fatalities (17% fa-
tality rate) occurred in spite of activation of self-contained self-
rescuers (Anon, 1995). In the Moura coal mine disaster in Austra-
lia, two coal miners drove out of the mine, after the initial explo-
sions, without donning their self-rescuer. They were in such a 
hurry to get out, it never occurred to them to don their SCSR. 
and even this did not achieve 1 OOo/o reliability. The radio 
system, even though it is extensive, relies on a leaky feeder 
antenna, and cannot guarantee reliable communication to all 
areas, plus the antenna could be damaged in the frre and 
most radios are vehicle mounted and therefore would not 
reach persons who are distant to a vehicle. Furthennore, 
most mobile equipment at EMP is air-conditioned to reduce 
the heat and this compromises the stench gas warning. The 
increased usage of respiratory protection can also result in 
people not smelling weak stench gas signals. In addition, 
stench gas cannot communicate anything more than an 
evacuation order. It cannot, for example, indicate where the 
fire is, or ask an unaccounted person to call in. Therefore a 
faster and 1 00% effective system is required. This led to 
adoption of a "through-the-rock" radio communication sys-
tem 13, which provides reliable one-way communication to 
all persons. 
• To ensure travel through smoke is possible, self-
contained self-rescuers are required. Experience at other op-
erations shows that these must be worn to ensure they will 
be available when required; at EMP, this has led to the 
adoption of a 30 minute SCSR as standard requirement, 
based on weight and size considerations. 
• SCSRs are primarily for travelling through smoke to an 
emergency refuge station; they are not primarily intended 
for entrapment. 
• It was also at this point that the decision was made to go 
to oxygen-generating self-contained self-rescuers and not to 
adopt filter-type self-rescuers14• The products of combustion 
in an underground mine fire on electrical cables and other 
plastics15, diesel plant, hydraulic power packs, conveyor 
13 Such a system is the PEDm or Personal Emergency Device, 
which relies on the fact that high-wattage, ultra low frequency 
radio waves can travel through rock, similar to the way communi-
cation is achieved to deeply submersed submarines. The receiver is 
retro-fitted to the standard cap lamp battery, and buzzes and 
flashes the cap lamp when a message is received. The message is 
displayed on a back-lit LCD display and the memory stores up to 
three messages. When no message is being received the received 
displays the time signal from the transmitter. 
14 Even though at EMP, SCSRs are primarily to travel through 
smoke and not for entrapment, it is recognised that if a person was 
truly "trapped", for example, in a development end, then the SCSR 
should protect them from POCs for at least the duration of the 
SCSR. For a nominal 30 minute SCSR, this could be 100 minutes 
for a person at rest. 
15 The plastics of main concern are polyurethanes, nylon, and 
PVC. All plastics give off copious quantities of carbon dioxide and 
carbon monoxide when heated. However, dangerous concentra-
tions of hydrogen cyanide are given off from polyurethane, nylon 
and some other polymers when heated above 2000 C. This happens 
whether the plastic is on fire or not, and even when there is no 
oxygen present. PVC also releases hydrochloric and hydrofluoric 
acids. Polyethylene and polypropylene give rise to only CO and 
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belts, diesel fuel stores, explosives, ventilation bag and a 
myriad of other sources are so varied and so toxic that filter-
type self-rescuers were excluded from further consideration. 
A further factor was that the Western Australian Gov-
ernment guidelines are strongly encouraging oxygen-
generating self-rescuers, and in Queensland from 1 January 
1998, only oxygen-generating self-rescuers can be provided 
as new issues into coal mines. 
• To ensure the evacuation order can be given as quickly 
as possible, emergency procedures needed to be changed to 
give the mine control officer the authority to issue this or-
der. Previously, a very formal process of entering "yellow 
alert", "red alert" and "double red alert" was required before 
an evacuation order could be issued at EMP. 
With these key conclusions in place, the spacing of 
Emergency refuge stations could be calculated. 
Australian self-rescuers are generally rated under the 
European standard, EN40 1, which provides for a breathing 
rate of 35 litres per minute for a 70 kg worker. This is a 
moderately hard work rate, and the duration of the rescuer 
will be significantly longer (up to three times as long) at 
rest. 
Nevertheless, it is good practice (Anon, 1997) to de-rate 
the SCSR to 60% of its nominal duration to allow for heav-
ier persons (the 95th percentile). For a 30 minute unit, this 
means it isde-rated to 18 minutes. 
A good practice design speed for escape under good 
conditions is 4.5 kph (Anon, 1997). Under adverse condi-
tions (e.g., dense smoke), escape speeds are reduced by 40% 
(Anon, 1997). Therefore, assuming adverse conditions, no 
person should be further than 18 mins x 4.5 kph x (1-40%) 
or 750 (say) metres from an emergency refuge station at any 
time. Full consideration must be given to the location of 
these emergency refuge stations during routine mine plan-
ning and operational planning activities. 
For mines or regions within mines where workers or 
visitors are not required to wear SCSRs, the maximum dis-
tance from an ERS was recommended to be 5 minutes at 4.5 
kph or 375m. 
Note that these distances are towards the lower range of 
other figures quoted which vary from 750 m to 1.5 km. 
However, if a mine worker is not downwind of the fire, then 
"any" distance to refuge is safe. It is only the workers who 
are downwind of the fire who are at risk (at least initially) 
and 750 m is a long way to be travelling through smoke. 
Even with early warning systems, these workers are more 
likely to smell or see the smoke before receiving any warn-
ing. Fires on underground vehicles produce large volumes 
of black, toxic fumes within minutes of the fire starting. 
C02 when heated, provided other materials such as plasticisers or 
fillers are not present. (Greig, 1989). 
Providing the evacuation order is given early, most 
workers will be able to access an emergency refuge station 
within 750 meters I 4.5 kph or about 10 minutes. In fact, 
most workers will be less than 750 m away and will be at 
the Emergency refuge station within about 5 minutes. This 
is exactly what a good egress strategy needs: most affected 
persons being able to escape to safety in very short time. In 
fact, at EMP most workers will be at safety before the first-
response Mine Rescue team can be assembled, and even 
before the mine management can reach the command centre 
(assuming an out-of-work hours fire). 
In the EMP, this requirement for no person to be more 
than 750 m from an emergency refuge station resulted in the 
requirement for 22 relocatable Emergency refuge stations, 
each designed to accommodate 8 persons (but in an emer-
gency, more could be accommodated). Moreover, the three 
existing cribrooms (lunch rooms) have been converted into 
emergency refuge stations each capable of accommodating 
40 to 1 00 persons. These precautions are necessary because 
of the highly mobile nature of the workforce and the very 
real possibility that a fire could occur during shift change or 
meal breaks. 
To ensure mine rescue resources can be targeted to "un-
accounted" persons, it is important that workers do not 
travel past the nearest Emergency refuge station, e.g., to 
travel to the cribroom. At EMP, it could take 20 minutes for 
persons to reach the main cribroom, even in a vehicle, and 
much longer on foot. Moreover, if people do travel to the 
nearest Emergency refuge station but do not reach it, then 
the search area can be greatly reduced; the mine rescue team 
will be able to start at the nearest station to the lost person's 
workplace and work backwards. 
All persons in EMP will need to know where the nearest 
Emergency refuge station is at all times. This is difficult 
with a highly mobile workforce, contractors and visitors. 
Induction and annual refresher training is not effective in 
this sort of role; instead it is planned to have workers use 
their daily safety sheet, which is carried on their person, to 
note where the nearest Emergency refuge station is. Moreo-
ver, as mentioned earlier, the three cribrooms in EMP are all 
being designed to function as large capacity Emergency 
refuge stations to cover the situation where workers do 
come back to these well-known facilities. 
For persons who are working in remote areas out of 
reach of an emergency refuge station, an egress permit to 
work will be required, which will ensure special precautions 
are in place in the event of a fire. Special barricades and 
signs will delineate these areas. 
There are two other key items required in this overall 
strategy. The first is an effective personnel disk board (tag-
ging system), to ensure speed and reliability in accounting 
for persons in the event of an egress being triggered. The 
effectiveness of the overall program is reduced if persons 
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rapidly get to safety, but confusion and delays then occur in 
accounting for those who are safe versus those unaccounted. 
The second is a fire detection system to provide early 
warning of a fire. Investigations are currently underway to 
selectively adapt coal mining technology to the under-
ground metal mining situation. Metal mines typically have 
much more intense use of diesel powered equipment and of 
blasting fumes than in coal mines, and this must be taken 
into account in the choice of sensors and the gas protocol to 
ensure there is not an unrealistic number of nuisance trips. 
FEASIBILITY, PRE-PRODUCTION AND 
CONSTRUCTION ISSUES AND FORMAL RISK 
ASSESSMENTS AND AUDITS 
As with many projects, the highest workforce numbers and 
least familiar workforce often occur during the construction 
phase of the project. Activities in this phase are "one offs" 
compared to the more routine nature of activities once pro-
duction is established. Fire hazards are high. Special effort 
needs to be made to ensure emergency egress capability is 
as good during construction as during production. In effect, 
EMP waS faced with considering two phases of emergency 
egress: one for the construction phase where the workforce 
would be hirge and inexperienced in the underground envi-
ronment, and the second for the on-going operation. 
It is also crucial that the separate issues of emergency 
egress at both the fmal production stage and during con-
struction be given proper consideration during the feasibility 
study. This should not have to be done "on the run" once 
the construction program has started. Critical issues are the 
integrity of the primary air intakes. What happens if various 
combinations of surface or underground fans go off-line? If 
there is a total surface and underground power failure, what 
happens to the primary ventilation? What effect does natural 
ventilation energy have? Will the direction of airflow re-
verse and how long will this take to occur? What environ-
mental conditions will be experienced? 
There is a tendency for the key design concepts of even 
the most carefully crafted egress system to be "lost in time", 
particularly with turnover in mine planning and operations 
personnel. Any critical aspect of the egress system cannot 
just be recorded in some notes or a report. Mine design 
working drawings and check -lists must be annotated to en-
sure key egress design criteria are not forgotten in the fu-
ture. 
Fonnal Concept, Design and Construction Risk Assess-
ments (at each stage of plant engineering) have proved in-
valuable at EMP in assessing the sufficiency of emergency 
egress procedures prior to commencing particular design or 
construction activities underground. "Boilerplate" solutions 
to egress problems, blindly applied for token compliance, 
do not provide real answers to these problems. There is no 
substitute for formal, "first principles" risk assessments 
which involve the operators and designers in the process. 
Finally, there is a need to ensure, after the egress meas-
ures are implemented, that the original "residual risk rating" 
has in fact been reduced to the desired level, and to ensure, 
by auditing, that operational readiness is achieved and 
maintained. 
TRIGGERS FOR EGRESS 
Whilst there are many valid reasons to evacuate a mine, the 
following are some of the critical triggers with respect to 
risk to personnel from fire: 
• confirmed or suspected underground fire irrespective of 
size (unless already extinguished), 
• compromised primary ventilation system (fans and/or 
intakes, ventilation controls) which impacts on the integrity 
or readiness of the egress system, 
• failure of mine fire fighting systems (e.g., loss of water 
supply if the mine partly relies on sprinkler systems), 
• compromised primary ventilation intake air (an example 
could be a surface fire or chemical spill which could affect 
the fresh air intakes. For this reason, great care should be 
taken in allowing combustible or toxic material (diesel fuel 
storage, heavy vegetation, ammonia refrigeration plants, 
etc) near fresh air intakes, 
• seriously compromised egress system equipment (com-
munication equipment, breathable air systems, recall of self-
rescuers, etc). 
THE OPERATIONAL EMERGENCY 
Methods of directing fire fighting in mines have been de-
scribed elsewhere (De Klerk, 1998). However, EMP experi-
ence is that key points include: 
Early alarm and evacuation. It is critical to ensure that as 
soon as a frre is suspected, someone on site has the authority 
and is required to order an evacuation. Some "false alarms" 
will inevitably disrupt production but better this than time 
being lost in a real emergency. The mine manager or an-
other off-site or off-duty executive should not be the only 
person empowered to order an evacuation. Two examples 
tragically illustrate this point: 
• The Sunshine mine disaster of 1972 started with a small 
fire while the senior mine management were 45 miles 
away attending a stockholders meeting. With insufficient 
experienced staff on site, the fire became much larger 
and claimed 91 mine workers. 
• In the Wilberg mine fire in 1984, senior mine manage-
ment had gone underground to witness an attempt to 
break a production record. They were trapped behind the 
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fire and 8 senior mine managers along with 19 other 
mine workers ultimately lost their lives. 
Keeping the ventilation system intact. Large metal mines 
tend to have very complex, three-dimensional ventilation 
circuits. It is highly desirable for the primary ventilation 
system to remain intact and functioning normally during the 
fire (explosions have occurred through carbon monoxide, a 
POC, being drawn back over the fire because of reversals in 
the ventilation system). This improves the security of the 
remaining circuits and therefore enhances the probability of 
successful egress for those who are underground. Some 
exceptions to this rule exist, but these usually relate to 
situations where the security of the primary intake itself is 
threatened. The on-going integrity of the primary intakes to 
unaffected working areas is paramount in a mine fire. 
Does the fire need to be fought? Fighting an underground 
fire is a hazardous activity. Generally, the safest course of 
action is to let the fire burn itself out (or at least reduce in 
intensity), providing it has been contained and no personnel 
are at risk. 
Buying time. Enormous confusion and conflicting reports 
occur in the early stages of a mine fire. A critical objective 
of the fire director is to buy as much time as possible with-
out putting lives at further risk. This reinforces the point that 
a good strategy is to get people to safety quickly so that 
there is time to consider further options and to resolve the 
confusion and conflicting reports. 
Targeting search and rescue resources. Simultaneously 
fighting a fire and searching for and rescuing lost workers 
requires a large number of highly trained personnel. It is 
crucial that search and rescue resources can be targeted and 
not sent off looking for workers in the wrong place, or 
workers who are already safe. If personnel tagging systems 
are used in the mine, these tags must be able to be interro-
gated during the mine fire. By implication, the location of 
these tags needs itself to be secure and accessible. 
Mechanisticapproach. Mine officials are rarely experi-
enced in fighting frres or in managing emergency egress 
situations. Training is of some value. However, it is impera-
tive that a control room exists which has "boards" for all the 
relevant information on its walls. Even the inexperienced 
fire director who is under great pressure and not necessarily 
thinking clearly can then see visual "memory prompts" re-
minding him of the sorts of activities he should be doing or 
monitoring during the course of the emergency. The key 
issues the fire director needs to know to safely manage the 
fire must not be available only via a lengthy, difficult to fmd 
and usually outdated written report. 
ONE FINAL POINT: LEADERSHIP 
There is one almost overriding additional requirement for a 
sound emergency strategy in any mine: this is the support of 
line and senior management. Unless senior management 
believes mine workers need a fair chance of survival in the 
remote likelihood of a fire or other emergency, resources 
will not be made available for the strategy to be developed 
and implemented. Just as it costs serious money to equip a 
hotel building or factory with fire escapes, smoke detectors 
and remote alarms, so too, providing a credible escape strat-
egy for an underground mine will cost serious money. 
Then there is the issue of support from the line: line 
management must also positively support the arrangements, 
otherwise they will be poorly implemented or not main-
tained and when required, they will not perform. 
At its most basic level, this resolves down to leadership: 
committed, enthusiastic, consistent leadership is required for 
any mine to develop and maintain a credible escape strategy 
with a high on-going degree of operational readiness. 
SUMMARY 
After attaining full production, Enterprise Mine will be the 
primary source of copper production for Mount Isa for at 
least the next 15 years. It has some unique features that have 
led to the development of leading-edge technologies and 
practices in a number of areas. A comprehensive emergency 
egress plan has been adopted by EMP which will result in 
acceptably low levels of residual risk for the workforce, 
even in the event of a remote probability catastrophe such as 
a major fire underground. This strategy will also signifi-
cantly enhance the ability of Mine Rescue to rapidly com-
plete search and rescue operations at greatly reduced risk to 
the mine rescue teams themselves. 
This strategy is built around the following key princi-
ples, which are listed in decreasing priority according to 
their individual impact on reduction in overall residual risk 
atEMP: 
• The earliest possible notification of the fire from mine 
control to the workforce using a through-the-rock commu-
nication system. 
• Emergency Refuge Stations to ensure all persons can 
reach safety within 30 minutes of the alarm and 95% of 
persons can reach safety within about 5 minutes 
• Revised Emergency Procedures to ensure the early 
warning technology and the close proximity of Emergency 
refuge stations can be used to full advantage to target search 
and rescue operations 
• The use of belt-worn self-contained self-rescuers to en-
sure all persons can get to an emergency refuge station 
• An effective Tagging System to ensure reliability and 
speed in accounting for all persons in the mine 
• Fire Detection and gas protocols to provide the earliest 
possible warning of the occurrence of fire 
It is important to recognise that this egress strategy is 
dependent on the risks at the individual mine. The conclu-
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sions in this paper should not be copied into other opera-
tions without a full risk assessment being carried out. 
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